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Introduction  
Unlike neo-classical theory, evolutionary economics consider competition as a dynamic 
process where the so-called unique ‘steady state equilibrium’ does not exist; on the contrary, 
the economy is understood to be in a constant state of flux as multiple equilibria are reached 
temporarily only to be subsequently disturbed by a combination of exogenous and 
endogenous factors to the macro- and micro-economic system (Papatheodorou, 2000).  Over 
the last seventy years since the end of the Second World War, business dynamics in the air 
transport sector are notably characterised by this evolutionary process.  In addition to the 
Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’, which is apparent in technical innovation concerning 
primarily aircraft engineering and passenger service systems, the evolving business models in 
the air transport sectors are structurally intertwined with both exogenous and endogenous 
systemic changes.  The former are largely related to the gradual development of international 
tourism since the early 1960s and the opening up of the airline and subsequently of the airport 
market a few decades later; the latter concern competition dynamics within a liberal 
environment and the emergence of business model differentiation and specialisation followed 
by a gradual blurring to maximise market share. 
 
In a nutshell, the early years after the Second World War were dominated by flag carriers, 
occasionally heavily subsidised, operating scheduled point-to-point services in a highly 
regulated business environment (at both national and international levels) out and into state-
owned airports almost exclusively depending on aeronautical revenue.  Subsequently, charter 
airlines entered the foreground in the 1960s to cover leisure needs on a seasonal basis.  Thus, 
by the mid-1970s the first wave of airline business model differentiation was complete.  
Since then, airline deregulation/liberalisation first in the USA in 1978 and then in Europe 
between 1988 and 1997 (that emerged because of growing public dissatisfaction over high air 
fares and low service quality) led to notable market entry and a second wave of airline 
specialisation where in addition to the two previous models (gradually redefined as Full 
Service Network Carriers – FSNCs operating scheduled services over a hub-and-spoke 
network usually in the context of strategic alliances; and leisure airlines offering 
predominantly seasonal services to holiday destinations), three others were added: Low Cost 
Carriers (LCCs) or Low Fare Airlines (LFAs as they prefer to identify themselves from a 
customer-centric point of view) are the major ‘success story’ of the post liberalisation period 
offering a basic, very competitively priced scheduled service usually out of regional airports 
on a point-to-point basis; while at the same time, all-business class carriers and regional 
airlines (which are not recognised by all analysts as a separate business model) also emerged 
in the market.  Soon after the opening-up of the airline market, the public- sector mentality 
characterising the great majority of airports until the early 1990s started receding.  Gradual 
commercialisation (emphasising non-aeronautical revenue) and steps towards privatisation 
redefined the airline – airport relationship and rendered competition dynamics meaningful in 
the sector, thus leading to the first wave of specialisation into hub airports servicing FSNCs; 
regional bases/satellite airports servicing LCCs but also leisure, all-business class and 
regional airlines; and spokes/peripheral airports willing to serve all but usually ending up 
with few services predominantly from LCCs but also from leisure and regional airlines – only 
occasionally from FSNCs. 
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Finally, corporate rivalry in the last ten years and the willingness to capture an increasing 
market share led to gradual business convergence à la Hotelling (1929) using differentiation 
and specialisation at other levels.  Differences between FSNCs and LCCs become gradually 
blurred as each of them has incorporated characteristics of the other in its business model, 
while the very existence of leisure carriers as a separate business model is questioned.  All 
business-class carriers still exist but often battered by recession and other factors; while 
regional carriers usually try to secure their financial viability as affiliates of FSNC.  In this 
environment of airline business model convergence, the main differentiator seems to be 
distance, i.e. short-haul where many carriers now offer a service closer to the LCC original 
concept and long-haul where the concept of “frills” is often still valid despite the entry of 
LCCs into this sector too.  Airport business model convergence seems to take place by a 
small time lag, as hub airports become increasingly interested in serving LCCs.  Thus, the 
main differentiation now occurs not at an airport but at a terminal level as different airport 
services are provided to different airline customers based on the latter’s profile.  Interestingly, 
this whole idea of convergence steps beyond the micro level as airlines gradually develop 
themselves into ‘travel supermarkets’ (due to their emphasis on ancillary revenue deriving 
from sources very different to their core product) while airport terminals become major 
shopping malls.  In fact, the very emergence of the airport-city (also known as aerotropolis) 
highlights the role of airports as concession managers and creates interesting (both synergistic 
but also antagonistic) dynamics with the neighbouring destinations.  On these grounds, one 
should also acknowledge the very role of the triangular relationship among airlines, airports 
and destination authorities.  
 
The remainder of this chapter discusses in detail the evolutionary journey outlined above.  
First, the chapter highlights the business environment before the opening-up of the airline 
market.  Then, it presents major developments in the post-liberalisation period essentially 
focusing on business model specialisation.  Subsequently, the chapter analyses the very issue 
of convergence at both airline and airport business models and continues by elaborating on 
the role of airport cities and the triangular relationship.  The final section summarises and 
concludes. 
 
 
Business Models before the Opening-up of the Airline Market 
In the aftermath of the Second World War and until the deregulation/liberalisation of the 
airline market between the late 1970s and mid-1990s in much of the Western world, 
traditional scheduled carriers dominated the business scene.  These carriers offered a typical 
three-class service (i.e. first, business and economy class) where different fare levels were 
largely justified by service quality disparities in in-flight catering, seat pitch and ground 
handling services (Doganis, 2005; 2010).  In many cases, these airlines operated as national 
flag carriers acting as government agencies. Due to their ownership status and importance for 
connectivity and accessibility of even remoter regions in a country, governmental support in 
the form of subsidies and/or tax-exemption motives became the norm.  Moreover, many 
routes were developed for political rather than commercial reasons; hence, the airline 
network configuration was heavily influenced by government decisions (Papatheodorou, 
2002). Traditional carriers also became active in cargo services.  The first cargo flight was in 
1910 between Albany to New York.  In fact, air cargo had played a key role in international 
trade, aid and relief operations. Many traditional carriers used and still use large wide-body 
aircraft with carrying capacity exceeding 80 tons mainly for long haul routes; medium wide-
bodied aircraft (40 to 80 tons), and standard bodies aircrafts (<45 tons) for regional express 
services (Wensveen, 2007; Morrell, 2011). 
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The development of international tourism in Europe and the chase of Florida sun by 
Americans residing in the northern USA states led to the gradual rise of charter, non-
scheduled airlines in the 1960s.  These airlines emphasised on leisure passengers, offering 
services usually as part of ‘packaged holidays’ featured by tour operators with whom charter 
airlines mostly in Europe often entered into vertical business relationships (Papatheodorou, 
2002). Leisure passengers were interested in direct, reliable flights with low fares and hence 
charter airlines were not seeking to compete on high service quality with traditional carriers.  
Destinations in the European Mediterranean Region became popular thanks to charter 
airlines.  Due to their dependence on sunlust operations characterised by high seasonality, 
operating off-season was a challenge for charter airlines.  To increase aircraft utilisation and 
avoid extremely low load factors during winter, their aircraft were usually leased to airlines 
serving areas facing reverse seasonality, for instance in the Caribbean and Australia.  Later, 
the gradual development of the winter-sports market enabled European charter airlines also to 
serve winter destinations such as those in the Alps (Doganis, 2005; 2010).   
 
Because of the heavy airline regulation prevailing in this period, traditional carriers were 
protected by barriers to market entry, capacity- and fare-setting constraints.  At an 
international level protectionism took the form of restrictive bilateral agreements.  In the 
beginning, charter airlines faced more traffic restrictions compared to scheduled carriers, but 
these were later relaxed (DLR, 2008). Nevertheless, non-scheduled carriers were not allowed 
to distribute their tickets individually (via their city ticket office and/or call centre) or via 
Computer Reservation Systems (CRS); moreover, they were not allowed to carry freight or 
mail either.  Scheduled and charter carriers in Europe became equally treated only after the 
implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2408/92 which abolished all related traffic, 
capacity and pricing legal restrictions. 
 
In fact, and although the air transport sector was one the first to be regulated, it was also one 
of the first to be deregulated (Dempsey & Goetz, 1992).   Initial considerations on market 
failure led to regulation; however, the inflexible and over-regulated airline business 
environment often resulted in passenger dissatisfaction due to poor value-for-money thus 
setting the fundamentals for a change in the civil aviation regime (Borenstein, 1992).  In fact, 
the very assumption behind deregulation was that new airlines entering the market would 
provide more variety of choice in flight services and lower fares (Smeth, et al., 2007).  
Moreover, and per the European Commission (COM (96) 514), the aim of liberalization was 
‘the gradual creation of a truly single market based upon the freedom to provide services 
throughout the Community in accordance with a single set of rules’.  Unlike the USA where 
the market was almost instantly deregulated in 1978, the liberalisation process in Europe was 
step-wise and implemented in three Packages. The First, adopted in 1987, relaxed the 
restrictions of the bilateral framework and allowed a number of smaller airlines to enter some 
of the important intra-Community routes. The Second Package, agreed in 1990, relaxed 
restrictions on fifth freedom services; eased restrictions on multiple designation of airlines on 
particular routes; and introduced the element of ‘double disapproval’ for fares. The Third 
Package was introduced in 1993, but due to the economic recession at the time the pace 
accelerated in 1995 and 1996 (EC,1996a). The Third Package was based on three interrelated 
pillars: the first offered free market entry and exit in the European Common Aviation Area 
(ECAA) by including full cabotage rights from 1997 onwards; the second extended pricing 
freedom; and the third pillar established harmonised licencing and certificates for 
airworthiness procedures. 
 
Finally, and during this first period under consideration (i.e. up to the opening-up of the 
airline market) and leaving aside infrastructural projects, commercial developments in 
airports were rather limited.  In their greatest majority, airports operated as government 
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agencies based on a public-sector mentality that saw no real role for commercialisation and 
non-aeronautical revenue (Graham, 2014).  As many traditional airlines were also owned by 
their respective states at the time an indirect vertical business relationship developed between 
airlines and airports.  This meant, among others, that aeronautical charges were not 
necessarily set by market criteria but chiefly determined by political decisions.  As both 
traditional scheduled carriers and charter airlines operated a point-to-point network, airports 
were distinguished mainly in terms of size rather than in terms of differing business models 
and networks. 
   
 
Business Models in the aftermath of Liberalisation: The Phase of Specialisation 
Traditional carriers continued played a very significant role in the post liberalisation period.  
While the early years of the market opening-up were characterised by enthusiastic new 
market entry, consolidation eventually prevailed as many ventures proved financially 
unsustainable.  Illustratively, in 1978 there were 15 major airlines in the USA, while in 1988 
there were only 8 with a joint market share of 91.7%, proving that the market had turned into 
a solid oligopoly (Smeth, et al., 2007).  Moreover, in the post 1978 business environment, 
traditional carriers in the USA replaced their previous point-to point network with a hub-and-
spoke system, as major airlines established hub bases recording incoming and outgoing 
traffic from feeder routes to smaller airports, i.e. the spokes (Smeth, et al., 2007). This system 
allowed carriers to achieve higher load factors while keeping the connectivity at the same 
level, i.e. serving the same number of airports.  Moreover, network economies allowed the 
introduction of new spokes at very low marginal costs.  In this way, traditional carriers were 
transformed into network carriers offering a full service (as opposed to LCCs discussed 
later); hence the acronym FSNCs.  Some examples of FSNCs are British Airways, Lufthansa, 
and Air France – KLM in Europe; and American Airlines, United Airlines and Delta Airlines 
in the USA. 
 
Hubbing proved a successful market entry deterrent in many cases and the construction of 
«fortress hubs» in Europe restricted competition, particularly in the absence of alternative 
airports nearby (Dobruszkes, 2009).  Dempsey & Goetz (1992) quote that in 1989 the US 
General Accounting Office found that fares in hub airport characterised by a monopoly or at 
best a duopoly were 27% higher than the competitive benchmark.  Moreover, Polk and 
Bilotkach (2013) argue that large hub airports have local monopoly features; hence, they need 
to be regulated to prevent abuse of their dominant position in the market.  In addition, the 
future of the home carrier and its hub airport become structurally interdependent 
characterised by asset-specific investments from both sides. Not surprisingly, airports may 
end up bearing a higher level of risk due to the inherently sunk nature of their infrastructure: 
while an airline can always redirect its services to another airport, the latter is spatially fixed.  
Hence, hub airports often require FSNCs to partly fund their infrastructure, e.g. in the context 
of joint ventures as is the case of Munich Airport Terminal Two where the local airport 
collaborated with Lufthansa.  In any case, it should be also acknowledged that hub airports do 
face competition from other hub airports for transit passengers.  This may lead to a ‘war of 
hubs’ especially in cases where sixth freedom carriers vertically associated with hub airports 
(e.g. as both being state-owned) follow aggressive expansionary strategies: the ‘Big Three” 
carriers in the Middle East (i.e. Emirates, Etihad and Qatar Airways) and their hub airports 
are a notable example.  Conversely, a highly congested hub airport can also affect the 
network strategy of FSNCs (Elhedhli and Hu, 2005) leading to de-hubbing (Redondi et al., 
2012) and/or new traffic opportunities to less congested airports. This phenomenon is 
mitigated in the case of multi-hub airlines, e.g. Lufthansa Group’s Frankfurt, Munich, Zurich, 
and Vienna airports that can reroute their traffic to another hub airport.  
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In addition to operating a hub-and-spoke network based on a high frequency of conveniently 
scheduled regular flights, FSNCs tend to follow complex revenue management practices 
based on price discrimination. In Europe, this is also related to the fact that further to market 
liberalisation, the great majority of FSNCs were eventually privatised; thus, using 
sophisticated revenue management techniques to ensure profitability became of much greater 
importance.  FSNCs also provide a wide range of pre-flight and on-board services, including 
different service classes. Moreover, and to capitalise on their extensive network, FSNCs put 
emphasis on building loyalty schemes, the well-known Frequent Flyer Programmes (FFPs), 
which raise switching costs to other carriers.  The value of FFPs was greatly enhanced in the 
1990s by the establishment of strategic airline alliances, which streamline collaboration of 
carriers on fares, marketing and capacity especially when granted antitrust immunity and as a 
second-best solution to cross-country mergers and acquisitions, which until today prove 
difficult due to international regulatory constraints (Papatheodorou and Iatrou, 2008).  Leick 
and Wensveen (2014) argue that the success of the first alliance between Northwest and 
KLM in the early 1990s led to the subsequent creation of the three major global alliances, 
which exist until today i.e. Star Alliance, Oneworld and SkyTeam.  These alliances are 
nowadays truly global and aim at creating a seamless network for participating carriers 
around the globe.  Illustratively, in September 2016 Star Alliance served 1,203 destinations in 
192 countries; SkyTeam served 1,050 destinations in 177 countries; and Oneworld served 
966 destinations in 161 countries (Flight Airline Business, 2016).  
 
Throughout the period under consideration, air freight remained an important revenue source 
for many FSNCs for high value commodities (e.g. high-tech products, capital equipment) and 
shock sensitive goods (e.g. chemicals, gold) that need fast, reliable and secure transportation.  
Unlike the all-cargo carriers such as Cargolux that operate a dedicated fleet of freighter 
aircraft and the integrators such as DHL that provide a comprehensive door-to-door service, 
most FSNCs that participate in the cargo market rely either on the belly cargo or the 
combination model.  Belly cargo carriers are passenger airlines that carry cargo in the holds 
of their aircraft to generate additional revenue.  Similarly, combination carriers (e.g. All 
Nippon Airways) operate combi-aircraft, i.e. multi-compartment aircraft, designed with 
additional freight capacity and, in some cases air freighters. They also have the flexibility to 
shift from belly capacity to freighter capacity depending on the cargo demand. Combination 
carriers serve a wide range of destinations since they usually operate on a hub and spoke 
network (Morrell, 2011).  The competitive dynamics in cargo operations pushed carriers to 
sign commercial agreements usually on a route-by-route basis and form alliances (such as 
WOW and SkyTeam Cargo); the latter, however, have not proved as successful as in the case 
of passenger traffic (Morrell, 2011). 
 
While the transformation of traditional carriers into FSNCs is a case of mild business model 
evolution, the real market disruption in the post-liberalisation environment was brought by 
Low Fare Airlines (LFAs) also better known as Low Cost Carriers (LCCs).  Southwest was 
the very first LCC worldwide commencing operations in Texas back in 1971. The LCC 
model, however, became popular in Europe from the mid-1990s onwards and then spread to 
become a global phenomenon.  LCCs offer a basic service without ‘frills’ charging lower 
price than FSNCs. Some of them were new entrants (e.g. easyJet), some were the outcome of 
radical business transformation (e.g. Ryanair), while others were founded by FSNCs (e.g. 
Buzz). Leisure passengers are frequent users of LCCs without being at the same time loyal to 
a specific LCC. Furthermore, several previously off-track areas (from a tourism perspective) 
were popularised thanks to LCCs; Carcassonne in France served by Ryanair is a good 
example (Palaskas et al., 2006).  In contrast to charter carriers, LCC serve a variety of 
destinations with diverse profiles ranging from city breaks in mainland Europe (e.g. 
Barcelona) to summer holiday islands (e.g. Rhodes).  
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To improve their value-for-money and effectively compete on price rather than service 
quality, LCCs aim to actively reduce the unit cost of their operations. Therefore, they use a 
single aircraft type with a single class, very dense seat configuration and offer all services 
apart from the flight itself (such as seat selection, airport check-in, checked baggage, in-flight 
catering, and entertainment as well as other on-board services) at an additional cost. 
Moreover, LCCs sell direct predominantly on the Internet without relying on Global 
Distribution Systems (GDSs) and often outsource non-core activities to third parties.  Thus, 
LCCs focus on ‘low fares, no frills’ and depend heavily on ancillary revenue relying on a 
revenue management model that does not only comprise the flight per se (as is the case with 
FSNCs) but other services too. Interestingly, though, in the first few years of their operation 
LCCs did not provide cargo services as they believed that the complications arising from 
entering the logistics supply chain outweighed any potential benefits.   
 
In essence, therefore, LCCs focus on short haul, point-to-point flights bypassing hub airports 
to avoid high airport taxes, slot constraints and often unavoidable (due to congestion) 
terminal delays that extend their turnaround time and decrease the aircraft utilisation. For the 
converse reasons, they prefer to use satellite and/or secondary airports due to the short turn-
around times, the availability of slots and the low risk of delays, but most importantly due to 
the low airport taxes/charges.  Such airports, on the other hand, rely heavily on LCCs. There 
are cases where the LCCs’ cooperation with certain airports proved mutually beneficial as in 
the example of Ryanair and Brussels Charleroi Airport (Barbot, 2006).  To attract LCCs 
satellite and/or secondary airports are willing to reduce airport taxes/charges or even offer 
subsidies, which in some cases are on the borderline of being characterised as illegal state aid 
(Papatheodorou, 2003; Barbot, 2006; Fichert and Klophaus, 2011; Wittman, 2014; Nunez-
Sanchez, 2015). In retrospect, LCCs did affect positively passenger traffic in secondary 
airports (Graham and Dennis, 2007; Barrett, 2004).  If many of these airports were not served 
by LCCs, their traffic would be quite low or they would be ‘hedgehog airports’ relying only 
on charter flights and characterised by acute seasonality. Therefore, LCCs do benefit 
secondary airports and the wider regions; not necessarily on a per-capita basis but primarily 
due to the sheer scale of newly generated traffic (Choo and Oum, 2013; Papatheodorou and 
Lei, 2006; Lei and Papatheodorou, 2010).  
 
By the early 2000s, the airline environment in the Western world had polarised around the 
two business models discussed above, i.e. the evolving FSNC and the nascent yet powerful 
LCC model.  Because of this gradual polarisation, charter airlines (now better known as 
leisure carriers) felt unsurmountable pressure as on the one hand they could not deliver the 
service quality and convenience of FSNC while on the other they found it very difficult to 
effectively compete on price and seat-only, one-way ticket flexibility of LCC 
(Papatheodorou, 2002). Many US charter carriers collapsed (Doganis, 2010) while in Europe 
the great majority of those that survived either sought comfort in vertical integration with 
large tour operators such as Thomson and subsequently TUI or transformed themselves 
usually into LCCs (Dobruszkes et al, 2016). 
 
Two other airline business models are also worth discussing.  Premium or business-class-only 
airlines may be regarded as the opposite of LCCs focusing solely on business passengers.  
They fly only on long haul routes to and from central airports like the FSNCs although major 
satellite airports (such as London Luton) may also be chosen to avoid congestion.  These 
airlines offer a similar service quality to the business class of FSNCs, but have a higher unit 
cost since they do not operate a hub-and-spoke network to take advantage of scale and 
network economies.  Eos, MaxJet and Silverjet, first appeared in 2007, offering point-to-point 
connection on the London - New York route, which is very popular among business 
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passengers and reached a traffic peak during that period (Claussen and O’Higgins, 2010). The 
2,000 premium seats offered per day generated $1.4 billion in 2007 to the airlines serving this 
route (O’Connell, 2007 cited in Claussen and O’Higgins, 2010). The three premium carriers 
had a combined market share of 21% (Avery, 2007 cited in Claussen and O’Higgins, 2010) 
on that route. Nonetheless, the initial success of these airlines proved short-lived as all of 
them eventually seized operations.  Financial problems in a period of unprecedented 
economic recession (that started in 2008) in conjunction with weak schedules, high fares, low 
utilisation and the growing market acceptance of private jets were some of the reasons why 
these airlines did not survive.  Regent Air and MGM Grand Air that operated a similar model 
in the 1980s went bankrupt for similar reasons (Kuchta, 2006 cited in Claussen and 
O’Higgins, 2010). 
  
Nevertheless, the all-business class model is still deemed viable by some investors at least 
(Claussen and O’Higgins, 2010). A recently established company operating this model is La 
Compagnie.  This has daily services between New York/Newark (EWR) to Paris (CDG) and 
London (LTN) operating with two Boeing 757-200 aircraft. The company focuses on 
upmarket entertainment, in-flight catering, customer service, on-ground operations and 
facilities and exhibits an environmentally friendly behaviour. A FFP is also provided to 
further steer passenger choice. Another interesting element of La Compagnie is its 
cooperation with Icelandair in aircraft maintenance. Yet and despite an average load factor 
above 77% on the London-New York route, the airline suspended this operation in Summer 
2016 quoting the forthcoming Brexit as the main reason; at the same time, it increased the 
frequency on Paris-Yew York route where loads were already exceeding 80% (La 
Compagnie, 2016).  In general, airlines that follow this business model have the flexibility to 
amend their operations at short notice, since business passengers do not usually book their 
tickets very early in advance; moreover, the frequency as well as the schedule of their 
operations is such that changes can be rapidly implemented. 
 
Regional airlines are part of the last (but not least) business model to consider.  Interestingly, 
this model originally appeared when the market was still regulated in both the USA and 
Europe.  Nonetheless, the very focus of FSNCs on hub-and-spoke operations gave a new 
impetus to regional airlines.  Using turbo-props or small regional jets, some of them 
specialised as providers of commuter or feeder services to FSNCs often engaging in 
horizontal business relationships if not integration with them; such agreements allowed 
regional airlines to use the name and livery of FSNCs, but also to further participate in 
regular flight plans and appear in GDSs (Smeth, et al., 2007).  Other regional airlines decided 
to offer stand-alone, point-to-point services on routes that could not be profitably served by 
FSNCs or LCCs whose fleet structure was unsuitable for certain smaller scale operations.  
Among others, regional airlines specialised on state subsidised routes known as Essential Air 
Services in the USA and Public Service Obligations in Europe.  For all these reasons, 
regional airlines may be perceived as being part of a separate model of growing importance; 
illustratively, while the European Regional Airlines Association had only five founding 
airline members in 1980, it currently has about 200 members including 22 airports and 52 
airlines (European Regions Airline Association, 2016). 
 
All five business models did play a significant role in reshaping the airline-business 
relationship.  In fact, from a period where scale of traffic was the main if not the only 
differentiator among airports, the post liberalisation period gave rise to different airport 
models based on the type of airline operations sought.  As discussed, FSNCs focused on the 
creation of major hubs while LCCs set their own alternative bases and empowered satellite, 
regional and peripheral airports.  Airlines associated with the remaining three business 
models usually sought similar airports to LCCs.  Irrespectively, however, of their 
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specialisation, the great majority of airports in the post-liberalisation period actively pursued 
commercialisation by increasingly focusing on the generation of non-aeronautical revenue 
(Koo et al., 2016).  The end of duty-free sales in intra-EU flights in 1999 did have a negative 
effect on many airports (Lei and Papatheodorou, 2010) but many of them ever since became 
more aggressive and effective in concessions management with notable outcomes (Graham, 
2014).  In certain cases, commercialisation was accompanied by privatisation bringing the 
previously dominating public sector mentality in airports to an end.  In Europe, this process 
was initiated in Britain with the privatisation of BAA in 1987 but subsequently moved 
forwards across the Continent: for example, Act 13/2010 modernised the management of 
Spanish airports by transforming AENA to Aena Aeropuertos that became a public-private 
entity in 2015 (Nunez-Sanchez, 2015).  In 2010, 74% of the publicly owned European 
airports operated as corporatized entities, while another 20% were private or public-private 
partnerships (ACI-Europe, 2010).  The phased liberalisation of ground handling services in 
the European Union introduced in 1997 with Directive 96/67/EC and the continuous 
consultation on slot allocation (European Commission, 1996b) are also in line with this 
mindset change. 
 
 
Business Models in Maturing Liberal Markets: The Phase of Convergence 
In his seminal 1929 paper, Harold Hotelling used a linear city model to show that producers 
may rationally use a minimum product differentiation strategy to capture as large a market 
share as possible (Hotelling, 1929).  Such competition dynamics are also apparent in the air 
transport sector, as in the recent post-liberalisation years, business models in air transport 
have gradually converged.   
 
When the world economy entered recession in 2001, it became apparent that unlike FSNCs, 
LCCs had a robust business model that equipped them (if properly managed) to survive 
irrespectively of the business cycle stage.  As FSNC recorded major losses and faced severe 
financial problems, many of them engaged in active cost reduction strategies involving flight 
and cabin crew; fleet planning and scheduling; as well as passenger ground (e.g. check-in) 
and on-board (i.e. inflight catering) services.  Consequently, the business models of FSNCs 
and LCCs are not as diverse as in the first post-liberalisation years since increased 
competition led to a reconfiguration of their operations. FSNCs adopted some elements of the 
easily copied strategy of LCCs or created an LCC division within their group.  Porter (1980) 
argues that the motives for airline group diversification are closely related to strategic market 
positioning and growth. For instance, the Emirates Group responded to the threat of Air 
Arabia by supporting flydubai in its establishment stage (Redpath et al., 2016). FSNCs 
adopted less complicated yield management, improved their aircraft utilisation, unbundled 
services (Leick and Wensveen, 2014) and put greater emphasis on ancillary revenue just like 
LCCs do: illustratively, United Airlines generated almost $6.2 billion from selling ancillary 
services to its passengers (Sorensen, 2016). 
 
In the meantime, LCCs also adopted FSNCs practices giving rise to the so-called hybrid LCC 
business model. A hybrid LCC may be member of an alliance (e.g. Value Alliance consisting 
of eight LCCs; Air Berlin being part of Oneworld) or use a mix of short and long haul aircraft 
types (e.g. Aer Lingus). In addition, the emphasis on single class cabin configuration was put 
aside with the selective introduction of a business class (e.g. Jazeera Airways).  Hybrid 
airlines also offer a wide range of airport and on-board services to divert business passengers’ 
demand away from FSNCs.  In other words, the new business model added ‘frills’. easyJet 
and Ryanair implemented allocated seating across their network and AirAsia X offers lie-flat 
seats.  Moreover, LCCs such as easyJet and Ryanair have decided to partner with GDSs in 
addition to selling direct.  Furthermore, new developments have shown LCCs (such as 
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Norwegian) offering a FFP: this is very importance since the FFP is the third determinant for 
selecting an airline after price and schedule. For business passengers, the existence of a 
loyalty scheme is ranked even higher than competitive pricing (Borenstein, 1992).  Some 
LCCs have also modestly engaged in cargo operations with B737 or A319/320 that have 0.5-
1 tonne cargo capacity; they also sell space to forwarders as is the case of AirAsia X 
(Morrell, 2011). 
 
In addition, and although none of the major European LCCs (i.e. Ryanair, easyjet, Wizz Air 
and Norwegian) has signed a code sharing agreement, such a practice has been adopted by 
other LCCs such as Virgin Australia which is codeshare partner with Etihad, i.e. a major 
FSNC, despite differences in service quality. Several LCCs have also started flying from or 
into primary airports. For instance, Ryanair flies from Athens International Airport and 
Barcelona El Prat, while Aer Lingus (now part of IAG) has kept its valuable slots at London 
Heathrow.  Some LCCs are also stepping beyond short and medium haul routes aiming at 
long haul ones by relying on wide-body aircraft.  Wensveen and Leick (2009) claim that 
LCLH flights have a different cost structure compared to short-haul routes due to the 
different set of operational and marketing aspects. Whyte and Lohmann (2015) argue that the 
actual flight management concerns (i.e. cruising speed and altitude, approaches, fuel burn and 
aircraft weight) are more critical for long haul flights and delays can prove an impediment to 
the LCLH concept. Still, some of these concerns may be overcome by an appropriate choice 
of aircraft and revenue management techniques. Moreover, operating a LCLH flight does not 
necessarily mean that a primary airport will be used. Frequency, network aspects such as the 
possible lack of feeder flights, target groups and in-flight services are aspects that the LHLC 
should take under consideration to succeed.  In the past, People Express, Zoom airlines and 
Laker Airways attempted to offer ‘no frills long haul flights’, but the venture ended up in 
failure (Shaw, 2007; Whyte and Lohmann, 2015). AirAsia X operated in 2009 for a short 
period on the route Kuala Lumpur to London and Paris (Daft and Albers, 2012).  Other cases, 
however, prove the potential viability of the Low-Cost Long-Haul (LCLH) concept.  
Norwegian currently operates on the north Atlantic route connecting London Gatwick to 
several USA cities; Ryanair operates a medium haul 5-hour flight from London Stansted to 
Ponta Delgada Azores; and AirAsia X serves the Kuala Lumpur-to-Sydney route.  Still, no 
LCLH airline has entered the Australia–EU open skies market (Whyte and Lohmann, 2015). 
The ultra-long haul routes (i.e. over 12 hours of flight) can be very tiring for passengers; 
therefore, a certain level of frills and service quality may be required.  On these grounds, it 
may be argued that in this stage of airline business model convergence, distance remains the 
last resort of differentiation: while the difference between FSNCs and LCCs in short-haul 
flights has been significantly blurred, the LCLH model is only nascent while the ultra-long-
haul routes are until now served only by FSNCs. 
 
At the same time, the airports responded to the changing airline environment by adapting 
their infrastructure to the new needs and often changing their ownership structure (Efthymiou 
et al, 2016).  High sunk costs of infrastructure combined with low marginal costs of 
processing extra passengers, forced airports to increase their passenger scale and diversify 
their travellers’ profile by attracting both FSNCs and LCCs (Starkie, 2012; Francis et al., 
2003). Farmaki and Papatheodorou (2015) claim that many airports previously dependent on 
leisure carriers now consider targeting LCCs to mitigate seasonality. Moreover, increased 
airline competition and the risk of airline bankruptcies, may affect hub airports that are 
dependent on a single operator. When Malév Airlines went bankrupt, Budapest airport lost 
almost a quarter of its scheduled flights with negative implications for business travellers 
(Bilotkach et al, 2014). The gap of Malév was filled by Ryanair and Wizz Air who offered a 
solid traffic solution to Budapest airport. Thereupon, many airports want to decrease their 
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dependence from specific airlines and seek to diversify their customers by serving both 
FSNCs and LCCs to secure their airside and landside investment (Koo et al., 2016).  
Still, and from a customer’s point of view the major challenge to consider is that the airport 
facilities used by FSNCs and LCCs are usually different service- and cost-wise. According to 
the IATA Airport Development Reference Manual (2015), space requirements for the same 
level of service differ depending on the dwell time (i.e. the typical length of time passengers 
stay in an area waiting for service) and the number of passengers. An airport can have the 
same level of service (A-F), but with different space requirements since for e.g. C service 
level the baggage check-in queue space is 1.4 m2 and the hold rooms (i.e. without baggage) 
space is only 1 m2 per passenger. Since LCCs travellers usually have cabin bags only and 
self-check in, the space requirements are only 1.4 m2 for A level of service or 1 m2 for C level 
or 0.6 for E level of service. Therefore, and following a strategy like brand proliferation 
(Scherer and Ross, 1990) hub airports invest in Low Cost Terminals (LCT) designated only 
for LCCs. The LCT building cost is much lower compared to the cost of a terminal designed 
for hub-and-spoke operations (Kazda and Caves, 2015).  This is because LCTs are linear and 
rely on finger piers that are more economical to build and bear lower baggage handling 
system costs. LCT operating costs are also 30-40% lower (O'Connell, 2007).  The LCTs have 
usually electronic kiosks that speed up the check-in process and reduce the dwell time and 
space requirements and since the LCC emphasize rapid turnarounds for their aircraft, space 
requirements are even more limited (De Neufville et al, 2013); therefore, offering a LCT to a 
LCC is cheaper. In fact, this strategy has been successfully followed by airports such as 
Milan Malpensa (where Terminal 1 is built for hub-and-spoke operations and Terminal 2 for 
LCCs) and Bordeaux.  Conversely, the purpose-built Terminal 2 at Munich Airport to serve 
Lufthansa’s hub-and-spoke operations, freed up space in Terminal 1 for use by other airlines 
including LCCs. Having the above in mind, it may be argued that from an era of airport 
specialisation in the early post-liberalisation years, we are now moving into a period of 
airport model convergence where differentiation and specialisation is now achieved at a 
terminal level. 
 
 
Emerging Trends in Airline and Airport Business Models: Stepping Beyond the Core 
Product 
At present, the current trend in business model convergence at both airline and airport levels 
shows no signs of receding.  On the contrary, stepping beyond the core product to exploit 
synergies and complementarities with other activities seems to have become a priority for 
most air transport market participants.  Having realised the potential of ancillary revenue 
from flight-related activities (e.g. baggage check-in fees and inflight catering sales) LCCs but 
also increasingly FSNCs transform themselves into proper ‘travel supermarkets’ selling on 
their website not only tickets for their flights but also complementary travel services such as 
accommodation, travel insurance and car rental usually in collaboration with large online 
travel agents, such as booking.com.  In this way, airlines capitalise on the popularity of their 
website as well as on their overall brand recognition and reputation to boost revenue and thus 
counter by the sheer scale of sales the negative impact of competition on profit margins. 
 
Likewise, airports gradually step beyond their initial focus on non-aeronautical revenue from 
typical terminal activities (e.g. duty-free shops) to become proper concession managers at a 
wider level.  The rapid expansion of airport-centric commercial development is now leading 
to airports with a city-like environment. The terminal which is the spatial and functional core 
of the airport is now transformed into an urban central square lead to the creation of an 
airport city. This may set the fundamentals for the subsequent creation of an aerotropolis 
consisting of ‘an airport city core and extensive outlying areas of aviation-oriented businesses 
and their associated residential developments’ (Kasarda, 2008:13). In other words, an 
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aerotropolis is an airport- integrated urban economic region.  Some examples of this evolving 
model are Incheon Airport, Dubai, Hong Kong International Airport and Kuala Lumpur. 
According to Kasarda (2008), an aerotropolis influences economically the surrounding area 
of the airport. The constant growth in passenger and cargo traffic and the need for non-
aeronautical revenues, in combination with the commercial sector’s pursuit of affordable 
accessible land and the high interest of landside businesses act as catalysts for the emerge of 
airport cities (Ashfold et al, 2011).  
 
A nice terminal can improve the airport experience which can be a determining factor for 
transit passengers when choosing an airline and its hub. Airport cities are attractive locations 
for regional and international corporate headquarters, conference and exhibition centres 
among others. Moreover, airport cities offer a variety of services. For instance, Frankfurt 
international Airport has an airport clinic serving more than 36,000 patients per year 
(Kasarda, 2014).  Xia and Li (2006) identify six major characteristics of an airport city.  The 
airport is undoubtedly the core, which subsequently exercises agglomeration forces, i.e. the 
airport city attracts industries, service providers and workers who may also become interested 
in residing in the airport vicinity. In addition, industries are spatially spread according to 
different intensities of utilisation. Travelling time to and from the airport is also an important 
characteristic since airport proximity affects business flows and goods transit. Finally, global 
accessibility related to the extensiveness of the air transport network, and the technological 
pre-eminence are major characteristics of airport cities. Some fundamental growth factors of 
airport cities are land availability; improved surface transportation access and intermodality 
(Efthymiou and Papatheodorou, 2015); growing passenger demand; airport revenue needs 
and the site-specific commercial real estate opportunities (Kasarda, 2014).  It should be noted 
that all airport cities are based around hub airports and serve mainly FSNCs. Nevertheless, 
the existence of LCTs is noted in some airport cities (e.g. KLIA 2 at Kuala Lumpur 
International Airport) proving that the latter can accommodate different passengers and 
different airlines at the same time.  
 
The main challenges faced by an airport city and an aerotropolis are land use and congruence 
with their wider environment. Few airport cities were planned and many emerged in a largely 
organic and rather uncoordinated manner. Traffic congestion, availability of land, parking 
shortages, inefficient multi-modal ground transit systems and safety concerns are only some 
of the issues that need to be resolved should an airport be designed as an airport city in 
advance. Furthermore, all the involved stakeholders and especially the local community 
should have a synergetic relation aiming at improving the position of the region and 
achieving the broader goal of sound international competitiveness (Ashfold et al, 2011). In 
fact, the traditional love-and-hate relationship between airlines and airports should now 
explicitly consider the role of local community and destination authorities in a proper 
triangular setting where risk sharing is of essence to resolve conflict and generate a business 
outcome which is beneficial to all.  This is because of such a relationship may be bruised by 
the ‘lethal quartet’, involving white elephants where extensive airport investment in 
grandiose infrastructure to establish an airport city and an aerotropolis is never fully 
recovered to the detriment of investors and the environment; the winner’s curse where 
airports and/or tourism destination authorities thirsty for improved accessibility and large 
inbound traffic flows end up outbidding their peers by offering FSNCs and LCCs too 
preferential terms to benefit sustainably in the longer term; free riding and coordination 
failure as local tourism service suppliers may have second thoughts when asked to assist 
financially regional airports and/or local tourism destination authorities to attract LCCs;  and 
the previously discussed spatial, market and temporal risk of airports and destination 
authorities as a result of strategic partnerships with a single airline operator either a FSNC or 
a LCC (Papatheodorou, 2016).     
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Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the evolution of airline and airport business models in the post Second 
World War period.  Starting from a period of heavy regulation, which seriously constrained 
competition dynamics, both sectors now operate in a relatively liberal environment at least in 
many parts of the world.  Further to a period of intense differentiation and specialisation in 
the aftermath of market liberalisation, airline and airport business models are now 
characterised by greater convergence as participants in both sectors aim at maximising their 
market exposure.  In this context, concepts such as travel supermarket and aerotropolis have 
become part of the contemporary air transport business environment.  Interestingly, all these 
recent developments result in complex relationships, which involve new stakeholders (e.g. 
destination authorities, tourism service providers, online travel agents) and hence raise not 
only the prospects of higher returns but also of new risks.  For this reason, skilful and 
enlightened negotiators are needed to build trust on rational business terms and make such 
complex relationships evolve from a transactional to a relational and even possibly a 
transformational level. 
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